Mechanical and Non-Mechanical Causation (2018)

Mechanical and Non-Mechanical Causation

Abstract

The following argument employs material from my own work in order to examine the role of mental causation in the realization of phenomena. In Sensory Knowledge and Art, I defend the idea that the constitution of the physical object is determined by an act of sensory perception, and this implies the influence of a non-mechanical form of causation. The purpose of this enquiry is to bring out in detail the interplay between mechanical and non-mechanical causation that is necessary to sensory knowledge.

    Causation is a more complex issue than the easily demonstrated union of mind and body and their interactions. Because the object is fashioned by perception both causal spheres are involved in all phenomena, and so we cannot make a simple equation of mechanical causation with the physical and non-mechanical causation with the mental. Therefore, seeing how the spheres are related to each other calls for an approach that is able to elucidate the subtle interconnections between them. A further difficulty lies in the veiled nature of non-mechanical causation. 

   I have tried to respond to these questions by using appropriate kinds of experience to demonstrate the relevant interactions, and by engaging with the problem from a number of different points of view. 

Introduction

There are two kinds of causation that are essential to phenomena and understanding depends upon our recognition of their differences. The first and more obvious causal sphere is causation that applies to the interaction between phenomena and is familiar to us in the laws of nature as exemplified in such uniformities as Newton’s laws of motion. The other sphere applies not to the interaction between phenomena but to the realization of phenomena. This is concerned with the inner life of sensory perception and constitution of the physical object by means of self-awareness in the subject by whom the phenomena are realized in experience. A possible way of seeing into this kind of causation might be to consider the experience of recalling names (for example, the name of a place, or a once familiar person, or a past composer or painter). In such recollection, the causation is close to the invisible influence of past experience upon sensory perception, in being an intangible realization of something by means of inner action. The recollection might involve some traces of sensuous imagery, such as that of a fragmentary impression of a suburban street, or a facial expression or a rich and interesting dissonance of voices singing polyphonic music, but these are not always necessary. Frequently there is no apparent cause, the name simply comes to us and if there are sensory aids to the recollection, which there may well be, they are subliminal.

   In many cases the sensory elements can be tenuous. For example, in trying to recall the name of a composer about whom I know hardly anything, say Obrecht, there might only be an orientation of thought in the area of medieval church music and a feeling that the name begins with O. Less definitely still, there might be a vague association of this composer with Ockeghem. Thus, the step that is taken from these sensory clues to the name involves a kind of causation that is quite different from the causal operations of nature, or those of other aspects of interaction between phenomena, such as the successful assertion of will by one person over another or tracing the relationships in a family. The unseen process in a realization of the name is akin to the unseen process of realization of phenomena in the act of sensory perception; in both there is bound to be much more of our past experience behind the realization than we can observe.

   To define the two realms of causation more precisely: causation 1 applies to the properties (or qualities) and interaction of phenomena in a world that spontaneously appears to us, and causation 2 applies to realization, in the act of perception, of the phenomena that appear. The interplay and mutual involvement of these causal spheres are essential to experience, the object and the existence of a world. Therefore, our interest lies in the distinction between the different kinds of cause, and how their interplay and mutual involvement create our perception of things. For example, the efficient cause that is evident in the running of water down a slope is a case of causation 1, and can be seen in this way as an uncomplicated abstraction from the phenomena, in which (all things being equal) there is a common perception of a simple physical cause. In this respect, realization of the phenomenon (causation 2) is the same for anyone who might have this experience. However, in the case of a boy’s feelings about his mother the experience is individual, and this means that, apart from the unique relationship between them, realization of the object is distinctive, and so causation 2 plays a distinctive role in its constitution. Here the interplay and mutual involvement between the two causal spheres is essential to a grasp of what is significant to this event and its object.

   It is important to recognize what these examples show and do not show. To begin with the latter, they do not show that the two causal spheres differ because everything relating to causation 1 is open to lucid analysis while everything relating to causation 2 is impenetrably obscure. Both kinds of causation apply generally to sensory perception; the examples demonstrate that in perceptions in which causation 2 is the same for everyone, causation 1 is obviously more open to analysis. Moreover, the complexity that lies inescapably within causation 2 does not mean that we can never think clearly and penetratingly about the causation that is relevant to one person’s feeling about another. For while the realization of phenomena may never be subject to complete elucidation, we can know a great deal from observation of oneself and others, and this knowledge is supported, among other things, by education and conventional wisdom, and acquaintance with philosophy, art, history, and the social and life sciences.

   This suggests that transparency upon which we depend for our understanding of causation within and between phenomena is a function of the uniformity that can be achieved by us in the realization of phenomena and the world. In this respect, we must consider the priority of this uniformity to anything that might be deemed an objective point of view. Therefore, transparency in causation 1 does not imply the truth of what is perceived; it is well known that in the past the perception that heavy objects fall more quickly than light objects, and that the sun revolves around the earth have been transparent and wrong. At the same time, uniformity of perception that water runs down a slope depends upon the material causation involved – we all see this cause and effect because water and a slope are physically related to one another in certain ways. Similarly, the rules of a game are specific and enable the game to be played, while grammar is practically ordered so as to make expression possible in a language. If the uniformity of perception is prior to an objective point of view, this does not mean that causation 1 is merely subordinate to and dependent upon causation 2, but it does imply a further causation, causation between the two causal spheres.

   That transparency in causation 1 is a function of uniformity of perception in causation 2 is necessary to the intelligibility of our sensory perception in general. Any assertion of significance in sensory perception must be continuous with patterns of experience that make sense to us and therefore with the continuous realization of phenomena upon which causation 1 depends. In this connection, the causation affecting relations between causation 1 and 2 is an underlying condition for the possibility of experience, sentient beings and the world. The other condition is an incipient object from which it is possible to realize the phenomena, and we can infer a number of things about this object from the ideas of causation that have already been introduced. Hence the incipient object from which the physical object can be realized in different ways must be able to give rise to the physical modes upon which intelligibility depends. Furthermore, these physical modes can only give rise to intelligibility if they include physical modes that are also media of sensory perception. Space, time, movement, temperature, volume, light, sound and solidity are examples of physical modes that are also media of sensory perception. 

   Therefore, a sentient being is both responsible for the realization of phenomena and an instance of the phenomena that are realized; as a synthesis of physical modes and of modes that are also media of sensory perception the sentient being realizes itself and a world in which it belongs. This implies, in the incipient object, a mutual involvement of materiality and self-aware sensory perception that is prospective until the sentient being apprehends itself and a world. In turn, these considerations imply that within the incipient object itself there must be an impulse towards sentience, along with a generation of physical modes which include media of sensory perception. The foregoing argument shows that the influence of causation 2 upon the transparency of causation 1 is essential to intelligibility and the possibility of experience of oneself and the world. This is both an affirmation of the vital causation between causation 1 and 2, and it is also an insight from which we can infer characteristics of the incipient object.

   It is worth noting that these characteristics are not simply inferred from the phenomena – as, for example, in the inference of a world that is designed from the evidence of form in things, or the inference of design from the fine tuning of elements in the universe, or the inference of evolution from the progressive development of life from simple to more complex forms. Here the concern is more abstract – it is a concern for different causal spheres and how they are necessary to the simultaneous realization of sentience, phenomena and intelligibility.

   If transparency gives us reassurance of a stable intelligibility, and is necessary to such intelligibility, then this must create in us a strong inclination to perceive oneself and the world (and thereby realize the object) in accordance with what we believe to be the way things are seen by others. Furthermore, the way things are seen by others might take precedence over a dispassionate enquiry into the true nature of things and people, including oneself. This is a reason why thought that is antagonistic to popular opinion often creates in us a feeling of anxiety; it feels like being taken to the brink of disorder and chaos. In Oedipus the King, the inclination to perceive oneself in accordance with popular opinion is powerfully dramatized in the central character – moreover, this inclination is exploited by his enemies. In the action of this play, we are presented with many reasons for Oedipus to be easily threatened by any departure from a stable intelligibility that is dependent upon seeing things as others see them (Nelson 2010). Of course, a theme of the play is to show just how far transparency in our conception of cause can be from a transparent perception of how things are. The disparity between them is deeply established in the dynamic of its dramatic action.

    To develop these ideas: any conception of one’s own life, and of its value, is shaped by the experience of others and is therefore given its general orientation by the community at large. This makes it inescapable that our judgement and sensory perception are guided by what we believe to be the way things are seen by others, and so the experience of a life that is valued in itself is grounded in concern for intelligibility in ourselves and the world. This is not to claim that we are always subservient to popular opinion or what we believe to be the way things are seen by others; a strong inclination can be everted by even stronger inclinations and there are opportunities for this in a variety of different ways, some of which are pathological and some of which are healthy.

   From this we can see a tension between the strong inclination to see things as we think they are seen by others and the individuality of sensory perception, for which there is a strictly personal history behind the phenomenon as it appears and is constituted. This personal history must include experiences in the past that have been strongly influenced by the inclination to see things as they are seen by others, but also include distinctively personal experiences that cannot possibly be transparent in the sense intended here. Therefore, as a form of causation, the realization of phenomena must have within it a subtlety that distinguishes it from the transparency that is possible and often achieved in causation 1. While the realization of phenomena makes it possible, in many respects, to see causation within and between phenomena as transparent, it cannot itself be transparent either to the subject or to an observer; the tension is largely hidden by the very nature of perception. In this respect, the two causal spheres are fundamentally different even though interdependent and mutually involved with one another.

   In the perception of a cup, for example, our direct intuition of a vessel for drinking tea or coffee can be regarded as transparent because we know that this is how the object is generally seen. Less transparent might be the subliminal echoes that this cup invokes of other cups, objects and occasions – from objects encountered in ordinary experience or, perhaps, in paintings or sculpture or film. These subliminal echoes could give the perceiver a direct intuition, for example, that the cup was in some way spiritually significant or in some way perilous. Then the causation would not be transparent because the perceiver would know that he or she was not seeing the object as it is seen by everyone. Taking this experience as a whole, the intuition of interaction within and between phenomena is capable of being quite transparent, while the realization of phenomena is not; we can only infer from our general experience of life that the object is realized in accordance with the past; the act of realization is instrumental to direct intuition but not itself susceptible to such intuition.

Identifying the Causal Spheres in Experience

The interdependence and mutual involvement of these two spheres of causation have interesting implications for the kinds of knowledge that are appropriate for different aspects of life and experience, and for how we might understand relations between the physical object and the incipient object. In this connection, it should be helpful to give a clear exposition of the orientation that is given to perception by sentience in the life of a reflective being. In particular, such an exposition should make it easy to distinguish such perception and its causal organization from the kind of explanation that likens the mind to a computer.

   It has already been suggested that the two causal spheres are systematically related to one another in a completely organized means of perception in a sentient being. Thus, the differences between the two spheres and the causation between them must be necessary to the possibility of experience itself. This suggests that causation 2 would not perform its function if it were susceptible to the kind of transparency that we see in causation 1. In reflective life, opaqueness of the act of sensory perception to the perceiver is necessary in order for the physical object to be realized; the simultaneous perception of a cup and the inner process of its realization would destroy the possibility of a clear perception of anything. And since the purpose of perception, in a reflective being, is to serve a life that is valued in itself, its end is perception of oneself in the world that gives rise to a life that can be valued. For this to be possible causation 2 is necessarily excluded from direct intuition. The object, oneself and the world are primarily what are perceived, and the realization that helps to constitute them is the means by which they are perceived.

   However, since we ourselves are included in what is perceived, causation 1 gives us a way into understanding causation 2. The hidden operations of realization by direct intuition themselves represent an essential aspect of ourselves, without which there would be no experience and no sentient being. In this light, our grasp of causation within and between phenomena can be extended to include the aspect of oneself that is instrumental to the realization of phenomena; seeing into causation 1 enables us to see into causation 2 as well. This is exemplified when we investigate a strong and unexpected realization of the object, as, for example, when a building with which we are familiar suddenly echoes the appearance it had around the time that we first encountered it. Here an ordinary involvement in the interactions within and between phenomena leads into an awareness of the way in which familiarity is related to differences in our realization of the object over time. In this case, the unexpected echo is a direct intuition of a past experience that is associated with changes in our realization of phenomena, but there are many examples of a more obvious opportunity to analyse the nature of causation 2 by way of causation 1.

   The popular entertainment medium of our times gives us a striking example of this. In seeing a film of the past, we can compare our responses now to those we enjoyed decades earlier and in some cases the difference can be significant. Actors who were spellbinding to a teenager might, to a mature adult, be excessively melodramatic, and an actress who was once richly and intriguingly beautiful might now appear to be far less extraordinary and perhaps even banal. This comparison shows us the realization of an object at different times and how the interaction between phenomena is affected by the inner motivation that gives a particular significance to the object. Here the perceiver has been altered by experience and so realizes the object in another way, and the transformation of our responses (causation 1) gives us insight into the operations of causation 2.

   If the object is realized by the significance that it is given by a perceiver, which implies that all phenomena must be the expression of some form of sentience, then we should consider more generally the influence of causation 2 upon the causation within and between phenomena. We have seen how unanimity of perception creates transparency in causation 1, and this might be simply one characteristic relation among many between the two causal spheres. In particular, since the constitution of the physical object is determined by the significance that it has for the perceiver, causation cannot be seen as purely physical with respect to the object in itself. When a purely physical cause is identified, it does not represent the object as such, but only a physical aspect of the object.

   As we never experience a physical cause and effect except in a phenomenon that has many other features, relations between the two spheres of causation might be elucidated by examining a particular experience, say, the experience of looking at a waterfall. We can hardly avoid the fact that, in this case, physical cause and effect has a most prominent part in the experience, as the drama is created by the effect of gravity upon the cascading sheet of water as it falls from a great height and ends in a turbulent continuation of the river. An observer might feel that this experience is a perfect demonstration of purely physical forces at work in the world, one in which nature is clearly exemplified as a machine that is governed by mechanical processes. We know, however, that this is not the only way in which a waterfall can be seen, and the physical causation at work here can be experienced as an aspect of an aesthetic response to the sublimity of the event, for which nature is not merely governed by mechanical processes but possessed by intangible powers. The physical presence of the event is only a manifestation of something greater that can be associated with a more complete and less abstract conception of the experience, and therefore of the inner life of a realization of the object.

   It could be claimed of this example that the experience of sublimity is no more than epiphenomenal to an event that is essentially physical in nature; that apart from the physical actions, such as that of gravity upon the water sliding over an eminent shelf of rock, any further perceptions are merely an expression of emotion and therefore transient and insubstantial. But if, as we have seen, the constitution of the object is determined by its realization in the sensory perception of a sentient being, then the sublimity of the waterfall is no less substantial than the force of gravity. Moreover, while the intangible powers of nature to which the sublimity of the experience seems to point are more likely to resist analysis than a mechanical action like gravity, they cannot be quietly erased from a clear conception of the physical object; the physical object is much more than a matter of purely physical causation.

   In terms that we have established so far, the mechanical action of gravity is transparent in that the perceiver knows that, in this respect, the phenomenon appears to him or her as it appears to anyone else, and this is also the case for its sublimity. However, a comparison between the realization of gravity and sublimity suggests an important distinction that can be made between sensory perception and our reflective knowledge of the object. While both gravity and the sublime are experienced in sensory perception as being as they would appear to anyone else, reflection upon the object might distinguish between individuals in their perception of the sublime. Far from assuming that intangible powers are perceived by all, the perceiver might believe that this is a privilege bestowed upon the few, and that experience of the sublime is a significant expression of sensibility or religious belief. Insight and understanding are not necessarily to be equated with transparency, and do not, like transparency, depend upon unanimity of perception. Conversely, perception may be judged to be misguided largely because it is in sympathy with how things are generally seen, being seen as it is seen by everyone else may be regarded as transparent but wrong. This is obviously true of matters of moral judgement, taste in literature and art, and political outlook. It is also true of any area of enquiry in which controversy is likely to arise, including the physical sciences. 

   The comparison here illuminates the opposition of causal spheres with which we are concerned. In this example, the difference between mechanical action and the experience of sublimity is strongly affected by the mutual involvement of causation 1 and the causal nature of our realization of the object. This draws our attention to an important distinction between the illusion that we see the object as it is seen by others and what we think about the object. The illusion makes the object transparent to sensory perception and therefore intelligible, while, in reflection, the waterfall could be given its character in one case by Catholicism and in others by river gods of Greek, Indian, Aztec or African religions. Hence, there is considerable room in our mental life for a divergence between the sense of conformity to general experience upon which intelligibility depends and our deliberation on that experience and its significance. 

   This draws our attention to a related distinction between the two spheres of causation. The illusion that we see the object as it is seen by every0ne else depends upon the veiled nature of our realization of the object in sensory perception. In sensory perception, the intuition is what is revealed, while the operations behind its realization are obscure. Therefore, the less intuitions are influenced by this realization the easier it is for us to secure a clear and unqualified understanding of the phenomena. The clear intuition of gravity at work in a waterfall gives us much greater access to the physics involved than the experience of sublimity can give us of the vast ocean of past experience that usually lies behind it. 

   This example shows how relations between the two causal spheres arise out of the natural inclinations of a sentient being (in this case a reflective sentient being), and therefore how these relations are necessary to the requirements of sentience itself. As the function of a life that is valued in itself, sensory perception is directed to a grasp of how things are, without which a clear understanding of the world and how it may be valued would be impossible, but this is qualified by the sense of value and significance that shapes them in experience. The world is neither an objective reality of which we possess a partial understanding nor a veil of illusion about which we are permanently and comprehensively deceived by personal inclination. Rather, it is created from a mutual involvement of materiality and self-awareness in which our motivation as reflective beings determines its reality, and this is open to insight and understanding that can be developed as a result of our reflection upon it. Such cognitive desire is compatible with the personal inclination that lies within our motivation because the impulse to know and understand life (to see things as they are) is itself a fundamental expression of reflective life. Hence, the dominance of personal inclination over perception of oneself and the world does not wholly prevent our seeing into them.

Intelligibility and the Interdependence of distinct Causal Spheres in all Phenomena

The rationale for mechanical causation is the absolute dependence of an intelligible reality upon an interconnected causality within and between phenomena. Since this intelligible reality is physical it requires relations that are mechanical in nature. The waterfall could not exist unless there were physical modes such as space, time, matter, movement, volume, density, temperature and contour; and these must be causally related to each other in a variety of strictly mechanical ways. Matter of appropriate volume and density and temperature must be able to move over a physical landscape with a certain topology, and this will involve a certain period of time. The physical laws that are consistent with these possibilities must therefore be an expression of mechanical causation, and it is easy to see that an intelligible world is dependent upon them. We can also see that these basic physical requirements underlie all of the experience and life of a sentient being, including other kinds causation – such as those of social forms, and the interpersonal lives of reflective beings – in which causation 1 may be transparent (as in the expression of moral attitudes or practical abilities) but is not strictly physical.

   The realization of phenomena is not necessarily mechanical because, though its causation can be inferred from enquiry into the causality within and between phenomena, it does not belong to the dense web of physical interconnections in the sense that a waterfall belongs to it. The realization of phenomena determines the constitution of a physical object but is not the same kind of cause as the interconnection of physical modes that are also media of sensory perception, and it is on this distinction that enquiry into mechanical causation and its alternative must be established. In order to progress in this enquiry, it is necessary to be precise about the meaning of the expression realization of phenomena, especially since it is obvious that the criterion for mechanical causation within and between phenomena applies with some force to our senses. There is a science of optics, for example, which describes in detail the physical causation that makes it possible for a sentient being to see. It is undeniable that such physical causation is instrumental to the realization of phenomena; however, being instrumental to it is not the same as being the realization itself, and this is where the essential distinction lies. The realization of phenomena can only be understood as belonging to mechanical causation if the chain of cause and effect from our contact with oneself and the world to that realization wholly incorporates the latter as one of its links.

   Concerning the nature of causation in our realization of phenomena, it is significant that sensory perception is determined by reflection. When turning a screw into a piece of wood I do not simply revive similar experiences from the past; rather I see and feel the sharp edges and relative hardness of the screw as it moves into the relative softness of the wood. Thus, I have a direct intuition that, in the absence of any impediment, the screw must go in as long as it is being turned. As in my seeing a cup as a vessel for drinking tea or coffee, or a waterfall as affected by gravity, past reflection upon the objects and their qualities has become essential to my sensory perception. Through abstract reflection upon the nature of the object the inner logic of its causation becomes integral to how it is directly perceived, and this means that in sensory perception there is a direct intuition of how causation works in these particular phenomena.

   This influence of reflection upon the direct intuition of phenomena has implications for our understanding of causation 2 in relation to mechanical causation. The direct intuition of how causation works in the phenomenon precludes our making the realization nothing more than a further link in the chain of mechanical causation. Taking an argument that I have used in connection with the mind-body question (Nelson 2018), the realization of phenomena cannot be assimilated into the mechanical causation within and between phenomena. Since the physical object is always realized in the experience of a sentient being, it is dependent upon certain fixed relations between the object and its realization. To assimilate one to the other invites an infinite regress: if the realization is turned into an object then this invokes a further sensory perception in which its realization of the phenomenon becomes another object, and so on. Seeing the realization of phenomena as mechanical makes it another object because, as we have just seen, the object includes in its essence the direct intuition of how causation works in the phenomenon. And since mechanical causation is defined as causation within and between phenomena being mechanical makes the realization another object, and one which invites an infinite regress.

   The first characteristic of causation 2 is related to time. Insofar as it is mechanical, causation within and between phenomena can be seen as linear and sequential. The screw is driven into the wood one turn at a time in an obvious sequence, and what begins with the first turn ends through a succession of turns with the screw being completely fixed into the wood. The sequence, however, does not have to be so easily perceived, mechanical causation of many kinds is invisibly at work in personal growth, as in the development of a child from birth to being able to walk and talk. But in this case the changes are not simply a matter of mechanical causation; in particular, psychological changes must involve the causation that operates in the realization of phenomena. This entanglement of the two causal spheres makes it virtually impossible to give a clear account of mechanical causation in this kind of phenomenon – we cannot expect to be able to show the exact causal sequence that has led from a child’s birth to his or her linguistic ability at the age of four. It might only be possible to indicate some phases of increasing competence and relate them to the environment in which this takes place.

   We can see in this example a difference in our ability to examine the two spheres of causation, for while the mechanical aspect of causation 1 can be analysed in isolation, causation 2 is accessible only through actions within and between phenomena. This is because causation related to the realization of phenomenon is non-linear, non-sequential and instrumental to the phenomena that are defined by causation 1. Hence, we can see quite clearly that the realization of phenomena is only possible by way of the interactions within and between phenomena; it is only in the experience of a sentient being that a realization of phenomena can occur, whereas causation 1 is not, in its mechanical aspect, determined by the act of realization. Though it requires the realization of a sentient being, the causation involved in fixing a screw is independent of who experiences it and how it is experienced. In this respect, there is an important distinction between causation relating to materiality and that relating to self-awareness – the mutual involvement between them specifically restricts our access to the realization of phenomena. Causation 2 discloses the phenomena and not itself, and can only be inferred from the phenomena.

   These examples show that transparency is not inevitable but possible in relation to causation as it occurs within and between phenomena, and that it is impossible in relation to causation 2 in itself. Specifically, transparency, which does not mean the perception of things as they are but things as they are believed should be seen by everyone, is directly related to mechanical causation, as this is the standard by which we judge how things should be seen generally. Mechanical causation affects all aspects of mind and body, even when concerned with moral and psychological attitudes – for example, the view that we should disapprove of dishonesty assumes a mechanical relationship between dishonest behaviour and the essence of interpersonal relations. To behave dishonestly can be seen as a violation of the mechanical operations of human interaction, and in this respect a kind of transparency is to be expected (it could be assumed that the violation should be seen in this way by everyone). However, this refers to a general disposition such as a moral law, and does not apply to all cases of dishonesty. If, for example, I disapprove of dishonest behaviour because of the offense it is to me, then this is not a violation of mechanical relations, and does not involve the transparency of perception that lies in seeing things as they are seen by everyone.

  Hence, mechanical causation does not end at physical determination but, as we should expect if there is a mutual involvement of materiality and self-awareness, pervades sentient and reflective life and affects all of the relations in the object and in experience. At the same time, these relations must also be affected by the non-mechanical causation that operates in the realization of phenomena. With respect to the example we have just seen, moral and psychological attitudes may possess a mechanical aspect, as in the assumption that moral behaviour is strictly related to the essence of interpersonal relations, but they are equally dependent for their substance upon a sense of value that is generated by individual realization of the phenomena. For example, it is a matter of individual judgement whether personal offense is transparently immoral; it may be reasonable to believe that everyone sees dishonesty as a violation of interpersonal relations, and much less reasonable to believe this of the more specific sense of dishonesty as a personal offense. 

   Underlying these arguments is a very general consideration: intelligibility itself is only possible because mechanical causation is pervasive in all aspects of the world and sentience. If gravity did not sustain the orbit of the planets around the sun then there would be no earth and no life on it, and the same efficient cause would apply to life elsewhere. Also, without the causal nexus of physical forces and interactions, such as biology and physical modes that are simultaneously media of sensory perception, there could be no realization of phenomena in the life of a sentient being. Even realization of the physical object depends upon mechanical causation. The other side of the coin is dependence upon the realization itself, and this non-mechanical causation is mutually involved with an all-pervasive mechanical causation. Intelligibility requires that they should perpetually act upon, support, qualify and alter each other.

   The intelligibility of moral judgement depends upon the mechanical causation to which we appeal when we claim that dishonesty is transparently a violation of interpersonal relations. Without such mechanical causation there could be no structure that would give intelligibility to moral attitudes, and it is the demand for this intelligibility, and not a theoretical derivation of morality from the mechanical causation of physical objects, that makes mechanical causation necessary to moral and psychological phenomena. It simply reflects the mutual involvement of materiality and self-awareness at another level. To develop our example along these lines, the idea that dishonesty is transparently a violation of interpersonal relations can be seen as following moral law in accordance with the idea of morality as responsibility to a life that is valued in itself. This provides a structure for the intelligibility of moral judgements, which can only be given articulation by the realization of phenomena that are morally sensitive. 

   For example, the use of dishonesty as a means of corrupting children is clearly a violation of interpersonal relations and therefore immoral, whereas dishonesty as a form of personal offense is not so obviously such a violation. While personal offense to the poor and helpless by the rich and powerful may be repugnant, opinions will differ over whether such behaviour has the same moral significance as the corruption of children. In this connection, the realization of phenomena plays an important role of giving substance to just how dishonesty is seen as a violation of interpersonal relations. How we imagine the suffering of the poor and moral indifference of the rich will affect our judgement, and therefore sensory perception and the imaginative thought that follows from it can have a powerful influence upon what is considered to be moral behaviour.

   The foregoing argument suggests that mechanical causation can be applied in all spheres as the kind of causation that is related to form and structure, referring to the ways in which things work in any particular sphere, while non-mechanical causation refers to the exact nature of what is realized in different spheres. Each requires the other, and for this reason it is a mistake to speak of things entirely in terms of only one of them. Of a mere sensation, like that of yellow or the sound of starlings or an itch, it is only just possible to speak of coherence, form or structure, and intelligibility is confined to the experience itself, which is often just a sound, feeling, shape or smell in certain circumstances, and might not even have an identity. Hence, the realization of phenomena can be slight and fleeting; it is only with the help of connections which require mechanical causation in many dimensions that phenomena of any substance can be realized.

Intelligibility and the Interweaving of Causal Spheres

Because intelligibility of some kind is essential to the object we can only approach the realization of phenomena by way of the action of mechanical causation in our experience. Moreover, not only must there be a mutual involvement of mechanical and non-mechanical causation, this mutual involvement implies that the latter is directly affected by the former without actually becoming mechanical. In order for there to be causation of any kind there must be some mechanism involved, but this is consistent with the possibility of a causation that is non-linear and non-sequential. This suggests that in one respect the two spheres of causation are interconnected and can shape each other while in another respect they are separate.

   In order to look into this relationship between mechanical and non-mechanical causation, we might consider a familiar kind of experience that is rather more complex than a fleeting sensation. In a thoughtless moment of amnesia, I ask a friend if he knows a piece of music which we have listened to together in a concert hall few months earlier. He says that he does know the piece but makes no comment on our having heard it together. Later I realize my mistake, and this makes me slightly anxious that I have given offense. Therefore, the next time that we meet I have a reason to be especially attentive to the expression on his face, and I scan it to make sure that he is not offended. From a psychological point of view, we can see that the two causal spheres are involved in this encounter: in relation to my own experience there is an obvious causal chain that is mechanical, linear and sequential specifically in connection with the fear that I may have offended him, while at the same time my actually seeing him is the realization of phenomena in the form of his facial expression. As it turns out I see that he is as relaxed and friendly as usual and this is a relief to me.

   This is significant to the analysis because the culmination is both the completion of a causal chain and a realization of the phenomena, and these two kinds of causation are clearly intertwined. Moreover, there is something more than their being intertwined, insofar as the realization has been influenced by a sense of anticipation created by the causal chain and its culmination in this experience. Realization of the phenomenon is to a significant degree given its character by the causal chain of events that has led up to it, but it does not fully account for its character. Seeing my friend’s face as relaxed and friendly as usual is equally determined by the non-linear and non-sequential ocean of past experience that lies within the realization of phenomena. In this case, we might assume that relevant past experience will include what normally lies within the experience of seeing my friend, along with something of what lies behind an anxiety over such things as embarrassment and fear of offending him. This example articulates what must be true of the two spheres of causation generally: in being generated within a chain of mechanical causation of one kind or another non-mechanical causation is qualified by the nature of that chain, and in this way both affect the definition of phenomena. Here we see how the character of causation 2 in action can be steeped in psychological activity that belongs to causation within and between phenomena.

   If we consider this relationship in reverse, it is obvious that the realization of phenomena must engage with the mechanical causation that occurs within and between phenomena. When an object is experienced as being unusually beautiful this might cause a sequence of thoughts about what it is that makes the object so; the effect of causation 2 upon mechanical causation is pervasive in our experience. This also suggests a continuously fluid interplay between the two causal spheres, in which each affects the character of the object – a moment of realization acquires something of its character from an antecedent causal chain, and, due to the effect of past experience upon its character, creates a further causal chain resulting in its own effect upon the realization of phenomena. Such a mutual involvement depends upon mechanical causation but is not reducible to it, since in every act of realization there is also a non-mechanical causation that is non-linear and non-sequential in nature. Unlike mechanical causation, causation 2 is unperceived and informs the object by its covert awakening of past experience.

   I show how these two different causal spheres determine the character of phenomena partly in order to avoid the simplification that follows from the identification of mechanical causation with materiality. Such causation does not originate in the strictly physical and evolve as we move from simple to more complex phenomena. Rather, as we have seen, mechanical causation is necessary to the intelligibility of phenomena, and does not imply a hierarchy of increasing complexity from simple and fundamental beginnings. Contrary to what is suggested by the term, mechanical causation refers with equal priority to all phenomena and is just as directly applicable to the intelligibility of subtle psychological activity as it is to the effects of heat and gravity. The foregoing account is intended to show that mechanical causation is essential to experience generally, and to suggest ways in which the two spheres can be interwoven causally so that realization of the phenomenon is at one with its intelligibility.

   The need to see intelligibility and realization in terms of each other has far reaching implications for our understanding of phenomena. Further to the suggestions that have just been made, there is room for enquiry into the question of rationality in our normal experience of ourselves and the world. To this point the argument has shown the mutual involvement of intelligibility and realization as reflected in the two spheres of causation. We can complete this train of thought by observing that the mutual involvement is necessary because the intelligibility is intelligibility of phenomena as they are realized, while the realization is realization of phenomena that must be intelligible in order to be realized. This mutual necessity means that the realization of phenomena is continuous with any causal sequence involving our experience. Thus, if we take a span of experience and pursue a causal sequence in order to clarify how certain moments have been reached, or how the different stages in this span have led to its conclusion, then a certain kind of tension with rationality is inevitable. 

   Since the intelligibility with which we are concerned is of the realization of phenomena and we envision a causal chain of such phenomena, the span of experience must include moments of realization, and many such moments. Because, as we have seen, the two causal spheres are fundamentally interactive, the causal sequence must be affected by the realization of phenomena, which by nature includes non-linear and non-sequential causation. This creates a problem for the analysis of causation, particularly in relation to the psychological determination of unfolding experience; since the causal sequence is largely made up of moments of realization, the linear and sequential clarity of mechanical causation must be affected by a non-linear and non-sequential causation of scrambled past experience within the realization of phenomena.

   However, we should not expect this interaction between the two causal spheres to be obvious in our ordinary experience. Generally, our normal surroundings and the people with whom we are most familiar appear to us as much the same from one day to another, one week to another and one month to another. In this respect, the causal chain that links one time with another seems to be unaffected by the part that is played by non-linear and non-sequential causation. In the normal course of events this causal sphere only serves to consolidate what is already significant to linear and sequential causation. A strong inclination to experience oneself and the world as enduring and secure means that we tend to realize the phenomena in ways that enhance the stability of our lives. To an overwhelming degree, we unconsciously realize the phenomenon so as to give it an illusion of permanence, and not as something that clouds its own continuity with the past. Similarly, if we see that somebody has matured into a good musician this perception will not include any clear sense of causation 2 but rather invokes a causal chain in which study, practice and talent have been purposefully exercised over time. Even though non-linear and non-sequential causation is essential to such development it is quite invisible to us and might play no part in our interest in how things have turned out.

    These observations confirm that the realization of phenomena in our experience leaves its impression on the sense of things that is sustained by mechanical causation. Thus, we can imagine a structure of receptivity to oneself and the world for which the continuity of life and experience is developed and altered by the realization of phenomena, apart from the larger emotional and psychological effects by which they are also influenced. Correspondingly, the continuity is primarily one of successive moments of realization, and in this the structure of receptivity is substantially a structure for such moments, and dependent upon the next moment for its own significance. The present moment can only live in anticipation of the next moment and the time that lies beyond it. In brief, anticipation is, in one way or another, given its motivation by a linear and sequential causal chain – which, in turn, is open to modification by the realizations that arise in the succession of such moments.

Causal Spheres and Experiential Solidity

Since linear and sequential causation is necessary to intelligibility, it is in relation to this that the foregoing argument primarily refers. The structure of receptivity is concerned with continuity in life and experience. But a structure for such continuity that combines causation 1 and 2 can only show how their integration is technically possible, it does not tell us very much about the life to which they belong or how their interaction shapes that life in experience. In addition to intelligibility, we are concerned with the character of experience itself and this entails what might be called the experiential solidity of sensory perception and realization of phenomena. With respect to this concern, the emphasis should be reversed: whereas the causal chain is the leading mechanism for intelligibility and realization of phenomena conforms to linear sequence, for solidity the causal chain conforms to this realization.

   One approach to the question of experiential solidity is to begin with a more precise definition of how the two spheres of causation are interwoven. For the continuity that is exemplified by causal chains (and the linear and sequential causation that is necessary to intelligibility) can be seen as simultaneously necessary to the solidity of phenomena. The attachment of causal chains to solidity is evident, for example, in the significance that is given to experience by concern for individual people and the world to which we belong, or the pursuit of interests and other purposes. In this connection, the causal chains that make intelligibility possible are equally an armature for experiential solidity in our sense of ourselves and the world; it is fair to claim that there is a close association between degrees of intelligibility and psychological inclinations that are fundamental to experiential solidity.

   This association conflicts with the tendency to align cognition with our knowledge of the strictly physical and the relations to which it must conform, and such conflict is compatible with the earlier conception of what makes causation transparent. To be more explicit, when physical relations such as the laws of motion or the law of gravity are seen to represent phenomena we disregard the association between intelligibility and experiential solidity – a physical characteristic is abstracted from the phenomena and assumed to be cognitively sufficient in itself. But if sensory perception is transparent because we believe that we see the phenomenon as it is seen by everyone else then we cannot escape the association. The mechanical causation that applies to physical laws cannot be separated from the realization of phenomena that ties this causation to experience. Our seeing strictly physical causation as it is seen generally gives us the illusion that we are seeing a law that is exemplified purely in its physical relations – the illusion, for example, that the water falls into the river below simply because gravity acts in this way, independently of any experience of this phenomenon. However, the law that gives causation its transparency in this case is itself an expression of experiential solidity, and specifically because, whether it is true or not, a law of this kind compels us to believe that we see the phenomenon as everyone else sees it.

   A simple comparison will help to clarify the relations that are outlined in this argument. On one hand, from time to time I have fleeting memories of a street in which I used to work. These images are characteristically fragmentary and imprecise but are of a definite location, with identifiable buildings and streets, and a short right-angled arcade in their midst. Compare this with my memory of having treated a past friend without much concern for his feelings, and undoubtedly caused him some pain. It is obvious that the latter experience has a solidity that cannot be ascribed to the former. Memories of the city in a certain place are little more than passing images of what has been experienced many times at a period in the past, while the mistreatment of a friend engages with my sense of myself, and with a sense fellow feeling that has been violated in the other person. Whenever the first experience is repeated it occurs in much the same way, whereas memory of the second can always be seen in a new light, especially in new ways that might increase my feelings of uneasiness.

   Fleeting memories of a place that are not obviously evoked are not unintelligible, but their intelligibility is quite limited. Since there are many other places with equal claim to be remembered it is impossible to understand why these particular images recur in experience; they seem to be random and insubstantial. So the much greater solidity of the other memory is inseparable, in this instance, from its much greater intelligibility and my seeing it as I believe it would be seen by everyone else. The degree to which a sense of my own character dictates the intelligibility of this memory makes it altogether more transparent, and gives life to its various aspects (for example, regret for my action and for the other person, inclination to repair an action when this is now impossible, and loss of assurance about myself, albeit briefly). It should, of course, be recognized that this interest in phenomena is not like comparing the intelligibility of different objects simply as objects, for which the experiential solidity of the phenomena would be irrelevant. As a physical object, one thing can be far more complicated than another, but in itself this has no bearing on their intelligibility. To somebody who understands it, a specialized motor engine is as intelligible as a screwdriver.

   The association of experiential solidity and intelligibility in the above examples is also related to the mutual involvement of mechanical and non-mechanical causation. Where solidity and intelligibility are weaker, mechanical causation is relatively tenuous; we can easily appreciate that when such transient impressions come and go without having any great significance for us there is little in the way of causal chains affecting the experience. Since this experience entails the memory of past events there must be mechanical causation connecting them with the present, but there is nothing to indicate a coherent succession of events between them. There might also be fragments of a causal chain suggested by the ways in which one part of the memory, say of a certain building, seems to lead into another, like an image of the arcade, and causal chains are implicit in the images themselves and any action within them. 

   Where solidity and intelligibility are greater, mechanical causation is much more clearly suggested. We have already seen that a nexus of causal chains relating to how the second example might be experienced by the perpetrator of an action of this kind, and that such a nexus could be created by the sense of personal responsibility. From the memory of having treated someone badly a number of effects follow directly, in a way that is both linear and sequential, and so from this point of view the second memory is also stronger than the first.

   In the fragmentary memories of a place, non-mechanical causation is related to the general orientation of sensory perception, and in this it is woven into mechanical causation. Even when the latter is tenuous and appears to have little psychological motivation, such inner experience must be an expression of the whole life of a sentient being. Here, the images belong to a substantial period in the life of an individual and, in this connection, they manifest the continuous involvement of a reflective being in the entirety of its experience of life. As fleeting but recurring memories they give us glimpses of the non-linear and non-sequential causation that is woven into mechanical causation by our experience of a life that is valued in itself. When these memories occur, I recognize them immediately as belonging significantly to the sequential unfolding of my life, while the impulse behind their seemingly random appearance is non-mechanical. In the more cogent experience of recalling a personal failure, the much stronger awareness of mechanical causation is accompanied by a more intense awareness of the tie between this and non-mechanical causation. Where there are good reasons for my being unsettled by the memory there is also a sharper sense of exposure to my life and experience as a whole (to something akin to my character), and, in this, to the non-mechanical causation of a life that is valued in itself and to which there is personal responsibility.

Non-mechanical Causation and the Invisible Action of Past Experience

In this argument, we can see that intelligibility is much more than a matter of reason and logic, and that sensory intuition extends to the influence upon perception of non-linear and non-sequential causation. In the first place, my knowing the world and my part in it are implicitly knowledge of the mechanical causation upon which their stability depends – for example, in my being connected to the ground and being able to move through space. I do not have to recognize this causal sphere to be aware of its necessity, in everything that I do mechanical causation is active in many ways, and in far more than my deliberate use of it. However, in a direct intuition of the object, intelligibility is also given to phenomena by the act of realization. 

   Mechanical and non-mechanical causation are able to act simultaneously because sensory perception operates simultaneously in different ways. The implicit awareness of mechanical causation coincides with recognition of the object or event, and this is integral to the realization of phenomena. Along with our linear and sequential apprehension of their organization we realize through non-mechanical causation their identity and character. For example, a river flows past, beneath some willow trees on the other bank which obscure it from me as it bends away to the left. In relation to mechanical causation, I see the flow as being caused by a surge of water over a gradient that is not particularly visible, the dull gleam of the water as caused by the subdued light from a cloudy sky, and the darker band of water as caused by the line of trees. In this respect, intelligibility depends upon mechanical causation that is linear and sequential (if there is a break in the cloud the water lightens in tone). But none of the causal features to which I refer here could be experienced at all were it not for the recognition that gives these phenomena their identity and character to me. This realization of rivers, trees and bends in rivers, and all of the other qualities that might figure in a perception of physical organization, is fundamental to the act of sensory perception and depends upon causation that is non-linear and non-sequential.

   Integration of the two causal spheres is related to sensory perception in the immanence to immediate experience of the whole experience of a sentient being. From this viewpoint, my experience depends upon the causal chains that encompass and include my existence, and so mechanical causation is obviously necessary to its possibility. In the absence of a complex sequence of coherently related events there would be no life and no relation of immediate experience to my experience as a whole. Simultaneously, the immediate experience is informed by contact between the occasion and my past experience, and this contact is non-linear and non-sequential in being directed from different times and with various overlapping influences upon the character of its realized phenomena. Immanence of the whole of my experience to the river scene gives the dull gleam of the water and its flat surface, its heavy green colour, and the orchestration of forms with river, trees and muted sky their subtle, distinctive and indefinable power over me. It is easy to imagine that in this respect (as a sensory experience) a person that I know well has a much greater power over me for reason of the same effect of past experience upon the phenomena.

   By the very nature of sensory perception, I cannot observe the contribution of any past experience or experiences to my present realization of phenomena, since the only evidence for the immanence of my whole experience lies in the realization itself. The object or phenomenon is, by definition, the only thing that is directly experienced, and so my knowledge of the part that is played by past experience can only be inferred by analysis of the present experience in terms of what has happened to me in the past. Thus, while I can often make reasonable inferences and analyse certain trends in my experience and behaviour, the validity of such thinking is consistent with the exclusion of any strict pattern of linear and sequential explanation – such knowledge is necessarily a question of judgement, which may be refined by many kinds of thought to produce a persuasive analysis, but not a precisely detailed account of the causation involved. It is not that we lack access to a source of information that would provide us with such an account, rather that the dependence of perception upon non-mechanical, and therefore invisible, causation excludes this form of elucidation. Even if we could see – in a flash –  the whole of our experience alongside a particular experience, we could not see the causation involved, since here one thing does not lead to another in a linear sequence (as it does in seeing the physical action of water falling by gravity, in strict consecutive order, over a shelf of rock). Everything in past experience that affects the present phenomenon does so immediately and without trace.

Non-mechanical Causation, the Character of Phenomena and Intersubjectivity

The foregoing argument has established the necessity in experience of oneself and the world for two complementary and interactive spheres of causation. This argument is specifically related to sensory perception, but it can also be related to reflective experience in its wider sense, as an opposition to any conception of the mind as strictly mechanical in its operations. We have seen that in being non-mechanical, perception gives the phenomena their character, and therefore their experiential essence, and this ties their essence to the immanence of one’s whole experience to the present moment. In relation to reflective experience in its wider sense, we might consider the presentation of a speech, which includes but is not simply a matter of sensory perception. For example, a speech on fine wines, or a political ideal, or avoidance of narcotics, or the virtues of yoga must in some ways depend upon what gives the relevant phenomena their character, and this is true of the subject matter of any speech. Thus, the phenomena that are relevant to a political ideal can only acquire their character from the ways in which the immanence of one’s experience as a whole has contributed to the constitution of these phenomena – revulsion against racial exploitation and injustice reflects the non-mechanical causation in sensory experience over a certain range of relevant phenomena. This is true also of the influence of others upon our political ideals; the impact of particular individuals, for better or worse, also reflects non-mechanical causation over a certain range of relevant phenomena, as in the sensory and emotional effect of certain personalities or attraction to a common cause.

   It is not difficult to see that this dependence of personal action upon the character of phenomena, and therefore upon non-mechanical causation, applies to our experience generally. There are no purposeful activities that are not informed by relevant phenomena, and no phenomena that are characterless – all are given character and significance by the past experience that is immanent in the act of sensory perception. This is not to deny the efficacy of reason and logical thinking in our purposeful activities, but simply to affirm that these activities depend also upon the non-mechanical causation of sensory perception; without this there would be no incentive to reason.

   Also connected with our experience in its wider aspect is how the constitution of phenomena by past experience is affected by other factors. Immanence of one’s experience as a whole does not refer merely to our sensory perceptions in the past, but includes the influence of psychological dispositions and our attitudes and reasoning. From our ordinary observation of ourselves and others we know that these influences are woven into all of our sensory perceptions and give them much of their content, both as immediate experience and as effects from the past, which must include memory and reflection. Thus, revulsion against the idea of racial exploitation and injustice involves a complex in which, among other things, sensory perceptions play an essential part, along with the non-mechanical causation that this entails.

   Together the preceding points lead into something more encompassing and fundamental. We have seen that the complementary and interactive spheres of causation that apply to sensory perception apply equally to wider experiences involving thought and action, and that all of the relevant experiences are affected by psychological dispositions and attitudes, as well as memory and imagination. It is concomitant to both of these points that we see water fall by gravity over a shelf of rock not simply because certain physical objects appear to us in that way but also because we know that this is how it is generally seen – the phenomenon is intersubjective in the sense that something of its essence is owed to seeing things as we feel them to be seen by everyone. The action of gravity is not only mechanical, it belongs to the essence of this phenomenon and to the world of which it is a part. If the motion of a waterfall were reversed, and water rose by gravity from the ground and over the shelf in the opposite direction, then the phenomenon would also change in meaning and significance. The character of the object, and not merely its mechanical causation, would be different.

   Thus, the constitution of the object is given to us by communication with other people (by incorporating the influence of prior experiences involving thought and action), and the incipient object is transformed by an act of perception that is generated by our participation in a common life that is valued in itself (thereby incorporating psychological dispositions and attitudes that are interpersonal in nature). This ties the non-mechanical causation that gives the phenomenon its character to the intersubjective grounding of our sensory knowledge of ourselves and the world, and, by extension, the whole of our thought and experience. In this respect, non-mechanical causation must be regarded as necessary to reflective life, and to sentient life in general.

Reflections on the Cognitive Significance of Interaction between the Causal Spheres

In the intersubjective nature of sensory perception and experience we see non-mechanical causation constantly at work, and it should be recognized that the intersubjective nature of reflective life is more than simply a matter of seeing the world as it is seen by others. With respect to human experience and behaviour, mechanical causation has an obvious part to play in the intelligibility of what we do and how things affect us, but the character of things, associated with non-mechanical causation, also touches upon the intersubjective nature of reflective experience, and in countless different ways. The initial conception here of non-mechanical causation as the means of giving substance to our sensory perceptions should be seen as one manifestation of a pervasive influence upon the whole of our experience as reflective beings. In order to expand upon what has already been suggested in this connection, we should examine more deeply the inner structure of other kinds of experience.

   One example is the seeming incompatibility between our reflections upon a person and the effect of actually seeing him or her. In a lifetime, there are occasions in which acrimonious and defensive thoughts about a friend over a few days dissolve on the point of meeting him again, and he appears before me in all of his blameless benevolence. In cases of such conflict and its dissipation an underlying imperative which protects the relationship can be enforced by the effect of non-mechanical causation in our immediate reactions. Here the character of the other person is adjusted against my own will by an act of perception that has nothing to do with seeing the object as it is seen by everyone. Moreover, it is not the intelligibility of the phenomenon that is in question, but its character and how this is bound up in the experience of a reflective being (namely, in a life that is valued in itself). Clearly, this is not simply an example of sensory perception, since it shows how the non-mechanical causation involved in sensory perception can react to judgements and related impulses, and, furthermore, it shows more than just the familiar conflict between what we think and what we feel.

   Another example is when we physically see as innocent somebody we know to be anything but innocent; an experience that can even make the person more interesting. Such inconsistency between sensory perception and moral judgement is a common experience, and especially illuminating when we are considering the action of non-mechanical causation – otherwise this action is seamlessly absorbed into the flow of our thoughts and feelings and impossible to identify. Whereas the intelligibility and causal chains that support it in ordinary life are open to observation, the equally powerful influence of a person’s experience as a whole upon phenomena is, as we have seen, intrinsically obscure. So, while the two constantly overlap and affect one another, and thus enable us to see ourselves and the consequences of our behaviour and the behaviour of others, the influence of past experience and its psychology is largely hidden. 

   In a complex action, like the execution of a plan or stratagem, the threads that unite the intelligibility of things with the character of phenomena are not open to elucidation. For example, Hamlet’s unsettling of the throne of Denmark presents us with many phenomena that are psychologically coherent in terms of his character, and charged with a rich diversity of emotional and sensory experience. But we could not, even in the most favourable circumstances, expect to see in precise detail how experience, behaviour and intentions are related to his personal history and its psychology. Intelligibility is only partial, if only because the part that is played by non-mechanical causation can only be included allusively in the portrayal of reflective life in action; as it is, for example, in Hamlet’s reference to earlier feelings about his parents in the soliloquy in Act 1, scene ii. Even if it were possible to disentangle the sphere of mechanical causation from that of non-mechanical causation this could not lead to a complete and satisfying explanation of the phenomena.

   In spite of the inherent limitations in our knowledge of things related to non-mechanical causation there are experiences in which the character of phenomena is reflected in an interdependence between the two causal spheres. This is especially true of powerful aesthetic experiences, in which the strength of character in the object is wholly dependent upon the range and subtlety of its internal organization. It is most transparent in music (simply as music) because in this medium the mechanical causation expressed in the strict employment of time, as a basic element of form, is physically realized in sound as a basic element of form. Of course, music has its form because it is designed by a composer and performer(s) to have a high degree of organization, in accordance with the capacity of art to portray reflective life in action. Therefore, while the absence of direct reference to phenomena means that the portrayal of life is allusive and open, the simple components, revealing life by making one sound lead to another, make it a relatively transparent expression of the interconnection of mechanical and non-mechanical causation. On one hand, music can be seen as the freest and least demanding portrayal of human life and experience, and on the other as the most intense in its display of interaction between the spheres of causation.

   Because mere sound in motion is its equivalent to the rich semantic resources of literature, powerful music makes a more precise and concentrated use of sound itself, not only of how one sound leads to another, but of how sounds are related over the piece as a whole. The purely physical medium promotes a use of time that closely resembles the nature of mechanical causation, and it does so by creating a sense of anticipation for which it finds some form of continuation, until it reaches a conclusion. Just as the water moves towards the edge of a shelf of rock and flows over it and downwards by force of gravity, so the internal structure of music created, for example, by melody and phrasing, articulation, volume, tempo, rhythm, colour and harmony makes, for sounds, a form of ‘necessary’ continuation and resolution. Furthermore, just as the mechanical causation in a waterfall belongs to the thrilling experience of seeing it as a phenomenon, so the character of powerful music requires a union of mechanical causation with the evocation of reflective life and its inner life, which depends upon non-linear and non-sequential causation. In this, the composer’s and performers’ musical intentions serve to heighten our awareness of the interdependence, and thereby intensify the underlying structure of our experience. The successful execution of this union is, to a large degree, what gives such music its compelling form and its depth.

   The following excerpt from an earlier discussion (Nelson 2010) gives us clear indication of the relationship between mechanical and non-mechanical causation in musical form. 

Bach’s Prelude and Fugue in B flat minor 

In order to give a more extensive example of the use of genre as an instrument of abstract thought in great music, I wish to consider a Prelude and Fugue from Book 1 of Bach’s Well-Tempered Clavier, number 22 in B flat minor. At first hearing the Prelude might be experienced as a sombre and heart-rending funeral march, and certainly this genre is present and so is the expression of grief. However, the rhythmic complexity of this music is the clue to a greater complexity in its use of genre, which affects the meaning of both the Prelude and the work as a whole. For the Prelude is dominated by three rhythmic patterns, and each of these patterns is organized in such a way as to make the sensuous effect more specifically concrete and thereby enhance the musical articulation of meaning. Thus, above the slow, common-time beat which conveys the mood of a funeral march, the opening bars establish a gentle wave-like figure whose step-by-step ascent creates an effect which suggests another genre. In particular, the repetition of quavers at the crest of the wave, with the strong beat falling on the third quaver, enables this melody to evoke, with some precision, the feeling of a lullaby. Suspension on a given pitch that ends with a stress on that pitch imitates the rest of a cradle at the top of its return to the hand that rocks it, and the imitation of a cradle in motion is continued in this way throughout the Prelude. 

   The third pattern is created by the motive to which this repetition of quavers belongs, since the structure of the piece is primarily determined by variants of this motive, with its quaver, semi-quavers, quaver, quaver shape ascending and descending to give the music its sense. So, in relation to the lullaby melody, the basic motive makes a slight ascent in the opening five bars and then makes its descent in the seven bars that follow, and this pattern is repeated almost exactly in the second half of the Prelude. The actual movement of the motive in this brief ascent followed by a longer descent is disturbing; the phrase drifts indecisively downwards, in a manner which might recall a line from Sonnet 18, ‘Nor shall death brag thou wander’st in his shade’. When we take into account the ways in which these three rhythmic patterns combine to create a sensuous effect and its associations, it becomes clear that this is the music of an everted lullaby, for a child who is deceased, imagined by the composer as wandering downwards in the shadow of death.

   This conception of the Prelude as a funereal lullaby is supported by a number of expressive elements in the development of its main ideas. For example, the subdued and sombrely coloured opening bars lead into a passage in which a vault-like harmony is created in bar 3, and sustained in bars 4 and 5 by expanding the space between the upper voices and the bass. Thereafter this effect gradually tapers off through bares 6-12, but is echoed in the second part, and thus weaves the idea of a catacomb into the piece as a whole, so corrupting even further the impression of a tender lullaby. This idea also coincides, in both parts, with the beginning of a slow, uncertain descent of the basic motive, and thus indicates the intention that lies behind this descent. Correspondingly, and again in both parts, at the foot of this descent the voices are compressed, creating a harsher texture, and evoking an airless and gloomy atmosphere in which movement is even slower and less assured. In the first exposition of the theme this ascent increases in difficulty until the music reaches an ultimate point of rest (bars 10-12), and the motive returns to the pitch from which it started at the opening of the piece. Here another turn is taken in the anguished feeling of the music, as a return to the beginning now works upon the confusion and suffering with which the lullaby rhythm is weighted, by thinning the texture to a few notes and conveying a sense of emptiness and desolation.

   This structure in the Prelude, touching upon psychological states that lie behind the music, is clearly not intended to refer to the unfolding of experience in the way we would expect in drama; rather the nature of a particular kind of anguish is illuminated from several points of view in accordance with the musical structure. Hence, the return of the motive to its ultimate point of rest in the second part is more severely and heavily chordal, in keeping with the desolation from which it emerges. Repetition and the plasticity of an expressive form based on relatively non-specific elements make it possible to achieve this kind of representation.

   This music also echoes another genre which is close to the feeling of moral failure that might well be connected with the experience that is represented in this piece. An insistent rhythmic pattern in the bass is employed elsewhere by Bach (for example, in the opening section of his Cantata 54) to suggest a mood of moral uneasiness and vulnerability. In this Prelude there is an affinity with such penitential church music, as the rhythmic pattern in the bass imitates the dominant motive as it moves between the upper voices. Moreover, Bach gives this rhythmic imitation a melodic shape that is an attenuated reflection of the ascending and descending line of the theme. Consequently, the bass line acts as both the intimation of a funeral march and a voice that implies the estrangement of life from its proper realization and fulfilment. Thus the penitential mood is extended in the severity of the last line with its dissonance, and the compression of its descent in the closing bars.

From this commentary, it is clear that the music is far more than a succession of resemblances. Though there are strong elements of resemblance, such as allusion to the genres of lullaby, funeral march and penitential church music, the piece is given form and structure by a high degree of internal musical organization. If this were not built on resemblance to some kinds of experience and phenomena there could be no portrayal of reflective life, and we see that the organization is governed by opposition, augmentation and refinement of what is suggested by these genres. In this respect, the power of the music arises out of a relatively transparent connection between its intelligibility and its character as a phenomenon. This analysis, which could be carried much further into the expressive features of an actual performance, suggests that the subtler and more varied the organization of the object the stronger and more interesting its character; the intelligibility which is aligned with mechanical causation is essential to the generation of character in the phenomenon, which is aligned with non-mechanical causation. Therefore, in this portrayal of reflective life in action the heightened expression of interplay between the causal spheres creates a heightened experience of the form that is taken by reflective life in ourselves.

   If the character of the object is not simply reflected but also generated by its intelligibility then the two spheres of causation must affect each other, and this can be inferred from our ordinary experience. Familiarity with a person or place involves a development of experience over time, implying a gradually more complex organization, which strengthens the character of the phenomenon. In such continuous transformation, mechanical causation entails a continuous change in the character of the object, since the influence of past experience affects every act of sensory perception. Intelligibility cannot be simply neutral because it depends upon being the expression of an object with an identity of some kind.

How Intercausal Causation Determines Phenomena

Thus, the argument has shown that in order for there to be phenomena at all there must be two causal spheres that operate quite differently but interdependently and in co-ordination with each other. This is possible only if there is another causality according to which this co-ordination is possible, and we are given a clue to its nature in the interplay between intelligibility and character in the phenomena. Hence, in the foregoing remarks, there is allusion to an intercausal causation which follows from the definition of intelligibility in terms of character, and a corresponding determination of character by intelligibility. A place or person is intelligible to me by having the character of a quiet village or a youthful vitality, and, under the further influence of past experience upon sensory perception, this intelligibility is then the cause of certain ways in which that character can be amplified or opposed or otherwise altered. This interplay of mechanical and non-mechanical causation is instrumental to the coherence of my changing perception of the place or person.

   In this connection, it is obvious that we must go further into the intercausal causation in defining the identity of things. The interplay of mechanical and non-mechanical causation also affects the constitution of things in ways that are essential to their character. A ball, or a machine, or an argument possess a mechanical aspect that may be considered as the primary source of its function; only because it is small, smooth, round and mobile does a ball bearing facilitate the turning of a bicycle wheel, and only because it is mechanically efficient does an engine generate the power to drive forward a motor car. Ideally, an argument has a structure that is linear and sequential in that one part leads to another until a conclusion is reached. Similarly, there are countless ways in which mechanical skills and actions define a person’s character, and the unfolding of experience is always mechanical to a considerable degree. However, even though the character of phenomena or of a person may wholly depend upon mechanical causation, and this may represent its character, character has another, non-mechanical, origin. 

   As we have seen, intelligibility arises out of the character that is given to phenomena by past experience, and therefore its mechanical causation is inevitably interfused with non-mechanical causation. In this respect, intelligibility is related to how things make sense, and we might say, for example, that a screwdriver that is made of foam rubber is unintelligible in terms of its function. Because it is concerned with the non-mechanical interest of how things make sense, the mechanical causation that is primarily a matter of intelligibility acquires its motivation from the character of phenomena. It is misleadingly easy for us to define a screwdriver solely in terms of its mechanical causation because that is what we see before us when we use it – the interfusion between intelligibility and character is relatively abstract and obscure. The same interfusion, moreover, is present whatever the phenomenon, whether it has a mechanical purpose or not.

   This argument shows that when we conceive the essence of something in terms simply of its function we overlook the interfusion between intelligibility and character, and fail to see the intercausal causation that determines the identity of things. In recognizing that the function of a screwdriver is necessarily generated by how things make sense, we introduce into its essence a range of possibilities that might be associated with the ways in which this tool could be significant. An interest in how things make sense may not be confined to one use and is more likely to be directed to many, some of which may be obvious while others are not yet conceived. If you have a sense of how arguments work you will know that they can be a form of serious thought, or jocular, or satirical, or a means of persuasion, of tempting somebody into error, or of characterization in dramatic art – among other things. These and possibilities as yet unknown belong to the essence of argument, which is not confined to just one way in which it functions.

   It is not surprising that myopic attachment to an exclusively mechanical causation tempts us to equate the essence of things with a conception of their function. Abstracted from the intelligibility in accordance with which we make sense of things, mechanical causation becomes a machine in the phenomena, an independent mechanism that forces the object to act in accordance with its will. The ways in which something obeys the laws of nature then become our guide to the essence of the object – as the expression of its function. For example, a screwdriver is given its essence by the efficiency with which it can exploit the laws of motion, shape and matter in order to perform a particular function. 

   But intercausal causation implies that, in sensory perception and inner experience, we cannot separate the identity of objects and their relations from the character which they are given by the experience of a sentient being. Where causal spheres interact the essence of phenomena is determined by the sense that we make of them, by how we make them intelligible in experience. It is not sufficient simply to say that water flows because it is liquid and can therefore be defined by this mechanical property – its being liquid is equally defined by its flowing down a slope, sliding down a throat, seeping into a sponge, or countless other interactions of space, time, movement, contour, solidity, fluidity and further physical modes that are related by being media of sensory perception. Since any conception of a waterfall depends upon an act of sensory perception that gives the object its character, and in doing so combines or synthesizes these media in a way that is specific to this experience, waterfalls and other phenomena are realized only in the varied responses of sentient beings. Without the character that is given to it by the inclinations of a sentient being there can be no phenomenon as such.        

   Moreover, by giving the object its character these responses determine what is physically realized in it; for example, in waterfalls we might see the force of gravity in the object, whereas a leopard could only see the power of falling water. Because they require character and a specific combination or synthesis of space, time, matter, movement and the like without sentience (or its prospect where sentience is unrealized) there could be no power of falling water or force of gravity and therefore no phenomenon, only the nonsense of mechanical action without its physical as well as its psychological realization. Words like force, attraction and power owe their meaning, in part, to experience of the things to which they are applied, and merely mechanical action, such as falling or flowing or spinning, is neither a phenomenon nor an adequate physical basis for phenomena. It is far more likely that an act of sensory perception turns a responsive physical armature into a physical object. And just as the perception of falling has a corresponding physical action in the armature, so must the perception of force and attraction. 

   Together the mechanical action and force make gravity part of an intelligible world, and, in this connection, purposefulness in nature contributes to the realization of phenomena by responding to the purpose in sensory perception.    Waterfalls of the very distant past, before the evolution of life, require for their realization the intellectual imagination of reflective beings and therefore depend upon experience of actual waterfalls; otherwise they belong to the physical armature for these phenomena as it was in the past. The force of gravity and other laws of nature play a part in this armature because it both changes physically according to physical laws and is inclined towards sentience.

    This helps us to understand not only the plasticity of an object’s essence within the experience of a particular individual, but also radical differences in how the same physical armature is realized by different creatures – what we see as a vessel for drinking tea or coffee must be seen as something very different by a lizard or an insect. Furthermore, it is a corollary that the physical armature in itself can only belong to an incipient object that has within it the capacity for generating sentience, from which phenomena are realized in sensory perception. In this respect, the inclination towards life in the incipient object folds back upon itself, in the intercausal causation that gives the phenomenon its definition. 

   This last point implies another causal sphere, one of which it is especially difficult to speak because by definition it is pre-phenomenal. However, we can infer from the necessity for continuity between phenomena and the incipient object that mechanical causation must be active in both – there must in some way be a linear and sequential progression from what constitutes the physical armature to the emergence of sentient life and its realization of phenomena. We can also infer that phenomena depend upon physical modes that are co-ordinated media of sensory perception; modes such as light, space, time, movement, temperature, sound, matter, contour and touch must already be present in some form in the incipient object, and so as to interact with each other and with the experience of a sentient being. Beyond this, if there is non-mechanical causation in sentience then there must be non-mechanical as well as mechanical causation in the incipient object, and relations between them must enable an intercausal causation in the phenomenon.

   With this argument as a whole in mind, we can see further into the physical armature as an incipient object. A point has been made about the mechanical nature of water and how this depends not only upon its being physically liquid, but also upon its being experienced as liquid by means of physical modes that are also media of sensory perception. Without this action, and the specific involvement of space, time, movement and others, the property of being liquid is not made explicit. This suggests, when we consider them as belonging to a physical armature for phenomena, that to act as media of sensory perception is a primary purpose of these modes. In this respect, they must be constantly ready to contribute to the realization of phenomena, as an expression of purposefulness in nature that serves the inclinations of sentient life. Thus, we can appreciate an underlying connection between the physics of mechanical causation, the physical modes that act as media of sensory perception, and how such modes in the incipient object affect the realization of phenomena. It is evident that even in its physics the object depends upon the non-mechanical causation that gives it character, and that mechanical and non-mechanical causation interact in its essence.          

   This, therefore, is one of the ways in which the argument shows that we cannot uphold the distinction between a mechanical sphere that is physical and a non-mechanical sphere that is psychological. Rather, the key distinction is between intelligibility and character, and they apply to all phenomena, including the representation of behaviour, experience and personality. At a basic level, there is a mutual involvement of materiality and self-awareness in which the identity of phenomena is determined by the mechanical causation which makes the physical object intelligible and the non-mechanical causation which gives it character, and by an intercausal causation in which intelligibility is necessary to character and character provides the terms for intelligibility. In neither the physical nor the psychological does one causal sphere operate without the other. This approach avoids an internal contradiction between attachment to the authority of sensory experience in our interpretation of the world and belief in the existence of phenomena that are independent of experience. Since all phenomena are given their character by sensory perception, a physical entity that is unaffected by the inclinations of sentience or their prospect is logically impossible. Matching mechanical causation exclusively with the physical and non-mechanical causation exclusively with the psychological obviously supports this misleading conception of phenomena.

   Hence, a cup owes its identity to the mechanical and non-mechanical causation that enable it to be seen as a vessel for drinking tea or coffee. A complex of mechanical causation makes it possible for this object to belong to a world that is familiar to the perceiver, while non-mechanical causation gives the object its character as something that is familiar and has aesthetic qualities and a stronger or weaker aura of significance. In addition, the function of a cup is basic to its character, and in this respect mechanical causation is woven into non-mechanical causation (intelligibility is necessary to character). These distinctions could equally be made of a public speech that is motivated by bad will or political ambition, of the self-awareness of a wood carver producing an intricately decorated piece of furniture, of the nature of wood or marble, or of the Milky Way. Interplay between the two spheres of causation can be seen in all of the kinds of phenomena to which our sensory perception of ourselves and the world can be referred.

   A firmament can only exist in the experience of a sentient being, and this character of the object is basic to whatever is taken to be the intelligibility of stars, solar systems and galaxies. There is no firmament without the experience of looking up into the night sky, and if the possibility of this were removed there would be no cosmological phenomenon to which intelligibility could be ascribed; neither would there be the intelligibility of what is incipient to the phenomenon. So, while the physics of cosmology and its complexities belong to the incipient object, all intelligibility depends upon the non-mechanical causation which makes these complexities intelligible as perceptions in the experience of a perceiver. This means that the discovery of planets, for example, is necessarily made within a reality that is constituted by both the incipient object and experience of the realm in question; it is only in terms of a firmament that Neptune is realized, and only from the point of view of a sentient being that the stars can be oriented in relation to each other. Therefore, the process is not one in which one observation is made and then another until the realm acquires some character; rather, the character of being a firmament is present in the first observation, and this conception of its character is developed and altered with subsequent observations and the reflection that accompanies them.

   Similarly, many of the properties of wood, marble and granite are constituted not only by physical characteristics that arise out of the incipient object but also by the character that they are given by experience of these properties in the diverse ways in which they are sensed, understood and handled by sentient beings. It is only in the light of their character that they possess certain qualities connected with being hard, or are easily carved, or have a smooth and crystalline appearance. Hardness is an objective quality of granite but this objectivity includes the character that is given to granite by standing on it – in this instance by all sentient beings. A person might also realize the hardness of granite as a feature of a landscape, as a gleaming object that interestingly reflects light, or as a stone that can be used as a tool. The realization makes hardness an objective quality just as being a vessel for drinking tea or coffee is an objective quality of a cup.

   Thus, an objective sensory quality is closely bound up with intelligibility and our experience of things as we believe them to be experienced by others. This is characteristic of sensory experience and, with respect to physical properties like hardness and solidity, such belief is essential to their being objective qualities. Furthermore, the solidity of a cup is not the same for a person and a lizard, since in seeing it as solid a person sees it as a vessel that will contain tea or coffee and this is an aspect of what is directly perceived. So, in different ways, objective qualities are related to the character that is given to the same material by other sentient beings, and where there is no sentient being this distinction based on character is lost. We cannot sensibly ask the question, ‘How is the cup solid for nothing?’ or ‘How is the sun hot for nothing?’ or ‘How is water wet for nothing?’ These material qualities are not just features of an object that are experienced by a sentient being, as aspects of phenomena with objective qualities they are intrinsically sensory and in some things they are specifically so. In the incipient object, fire can melt, boil and incinerate other things, but only prospectively can it be bright and colourful; like the physical object itself, tone and colour depend for their realization upon an act of sensory perception. This is also true of aesthetic significance: an interesting face or spellbinding melody, the compelling form of a piece of sculpture or architecture, or the beauties of nature are similarly dependent. 

   In relation to seeing things as they are seen by everyone, a distinction has to be made between what is characteristic of sensory perception and what we think. Because we see the object and not how its constitution is determined by the act of perception we cannot but assume that this is how it appears to other people. This assumption is necessary, in a life that is valued in itself, to giving the object its general significance and character, and is made independently of reflection and common sense. (In this respect, it is an illusion that is akin to the illusion of permanence.) For example, though I know that my pleasure in listening to the music of Webern is shared by a relatively small number of people, in listening to his music I implicitly assume that this is how it sounds and what it means, without qualification. It is necessary to its having significance and character that I feel that is experienced in this way by any other listener. Similarly, I cannot perceive Bobby without feeling that this is how she is and therefore must appear to anyone else, even though I know that Keith must see her differently and feel that his perception is how she appears to anyone else. If my perception were such that I could see how my own nature and past experience affected my image of her, and thereby lost the sense of sharing it with others, the perception would collapse altogether. The character that I subliminally give it is necessary to its intelligibility.  

   The implications of this argument should be clear enough. Intelligibility is grounded in a life-oriented order which gives the object its character. There is no independent reality that we simply look out onto and manipulate and interpret according to our own inclinations. Thus, there can be no world that is separate from cognitive involvement, and what is purely material is merely incipient to the realization of phenomena by the sensory perception of sentient beings. In the foregoing argument, I have suggested some of the ways in which this realization is given its form and structure by the interplay between mechanical and non-mechanical causation.

Related Texts  

Nelson, B. R. Forms of Enlightenment in Art. Cambridge: Open Angle Books, 2010

Nelson, B. R. Sensory Knowledge and Art. Cambridge: Open Angle Books, 2018